









Why economic growth occurs – or does not occur –
can be regarded as the question that concerns eco-
nomics. Early answers to this question – the most
famous being those given by Adam Smith in his
“Inquiry” (1776) – focused primarily on what we
now call “institutional causes”. The later introduc-
tion of more refined mathematical tools into eco-
nomic analysis, and specifically into neo-classical
growth theory, led to an emphasis on those growth
determinants that lend themselves easily to mathe-
matical treatment. Thus, for quite a while the aug-
mentation of capital and labour, technical progress
as well as the interplay between these factors have
been considered sufficient to offer a deep enough
understanding of the underlying causes of economic
growth. It was the seminal work of Douglas North
and Robert Thomas (1973) that challenged this view
and laid the foundation for institutional economics.
Basically, it was a move that went back to the roots,
although it took some time until institutions became
a respected subject in economic and econometric
analysis. Meanwhile, not only direct factors of pro-
duction but also institutional characteristics of
economies (and of societies, for that matter) have
been made measurable. The quantitative expression
of institutions has been used for econometric com-
parisons over time and across countries, and for the
continued search for the fundamental causes of eco-
nomic growth.
It is this analytical tradition within which Eicher and
Röhn (see this issue of DICE Report) develop an
array of endogenously selected and weighted eco-
nomic indicators that are combined into one aggre-
gate index of growth-conducive institutional quality
in OECD countries. Factor analysis is employed in
order to reduce the dimensionality of independent
variables. The economically relevant factors are
regressed on the average GDP per capita growth
rates of 1990–1994, 1994–1998 and 1998–2002. This
procedure resulted in a set of factors that is able to
explain 44 percent of the variation in per capita
GDP growth rates. The factor coefficient estimates
together with the weights of each sub-index in a fac-
tor were then used to establish the impact of each
sub-index on the aggregate institution index. Finally,
the weights of each component in a sub-index were
employed to calculate the influence of each institu-
tional variable on the overall Institutions Climate
Index for OECD Countries.
The result of the factor and regression analysis is an
aggregate institutions index which is composed of
eight distinct sub-indices (with their contribution to
the overall index in brackets): Optimal Taxation
(21.1 percent), Basic Institutional Quality (21.0 per-
cent), Fiscal Burden (16.7 percent), Human Capital
Efficiency (14.9 percent), Trade Openness (8.2 per-
cent), Labour Markets (8.1 percent), Structure of
Government Expenditure (6.6 percent), and Capital
Markets (3.3 percent). Each sub-index is again com-
prised of several components. All components are
aggregated into one index score for each country.
The index is normalised to a range from zero to
unity.A score of 0 (1) indicates that a country posess-
es the minimum (maximum) institutional quality
observed within the entire sample in all components.
The normalisation procedure assures comparability
of the index over time.
The aim of this article is to relate the country rank-
ings and their change over time to institutions, eco-
nomic policy and, specifically, to economic policy
reforms. In a first chapter, we consider four years
(1994, 1998, 2002 and 2006) and highlight those
countries which were able to keep either a high or
low ranking over the period of twelve years.In a next
step we focus on those countries that changed their
ranking considerably, either moving up (the “ad-
vancers”) or moving down (the “decliners”) in the
rankings.The eight sub-indices of the total index are
used to shed light on the determinants of the
improved ranking of four advancer countries: New
Zealand, Australia, Finland and Denmark. For two
of them – New Zealand and Finland – we then ask
how institutional change and economic policy
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reforms can be related to their improved ranking.
This is done on the basis of 23 components of the
Index, which were broken down from the above
mentioned eight sub-indices.1The same procedure is
then applied to the decliner countries.Four countries
with a downward trend (Japan, Switzerland, Norway
and South Korea) are considered on the basis of the
8 sub-indices. For two of them – Japan and Swit-
zerland – we relate the 23 components to their eco-
nomic policy.The article closes with a summary.
Ranking of countries 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006
Table 1 displays the country index scores and rank-
ings of the Institutions Climate Index for selected
years (1994, 1998, 2002, 2006).2 The index scores are
comparable over time and show the absolute differ-
ences of the institutional quality among countries.
They are the basis for the ranking of countries.
Comparing the country rankings (i.e.,the development
of a country’s institutional climate) over time reveals
some interesting insights. Measured on the basis of the
average ranking position,the United States came out at
the top.The country ranked first in 1994 and 1998 and
second in 2002 and 2006. Australia is in second place,
although it ranked only ninth in 1994. It continuously
climbed up the ladder until it took the lead for the first
time in 2002,which it still held in 2006.The third of the
most successful countries is Canada, which ranked
third in 1994, fifth in 1998, third in 2002 and fourth in
2006. Ireland, the fourth country, performed very well
in the late 1990s until the early years of the new centu-
ry. However, in 2002 Ireland dropped to the fifth posi-
tion, and has remained there since then.
Turning to the other end of the ranking scale we find
Turkey,Mexico,Italy and Greece at the bottom of the
Index for the complete period, indicating persistent
institutional deficiencies in these countries.The high-
est ranking of the four countries was achieved by
Greece in 2006 with position 20.
The country rankings and their change over time,
although interesting in themselves, mask important
Table 1 
Country rankings











1 USA 0.692 USA 0.690 Australia 0.701 Australia 0.710
2 Japan 0.674 Ireland 0.673 USA 0.691 USA 0.681
3 Canada 0.648 Japan 0.664 Canada 0.678 Netherlands 0.670
4 Switzerland 0.647 Australia 0.660 Netherlands 0.665 Canada 0.668
5 Ireland 0.629 Canada 0.648 Ireland 0.657 Ireland 0.658
6 Norway 0.619 Netherlands 0.644 UK 0.653 UK 0.656
7 Germany 0.617 UK 0.643 Switzerland 0.652 N. Zealand 0.651
8 Netherlands 0.616 Norway 0.640 Germany 0.640 Finland 0.646
9 Australia 0.613 Switzerland 0.636 N. Zealand 0.630 Denmark 0.643
10 UK 0.610 Germany 0.631 Finland 0.628 Germany 0.634
11 Belgium 0.585 Finland 0.612 Norway 0.626 Switzerland 0.634
12 Austria 0.573 Portugal 0.603 Sweden 0.610 Norway 0.629
13 Denmark 0.573 Sweden 0.597 Japan 0.609 Sweden 0.627
14 Finland 0.569 N. Zealand 0.596 Denmark 0.608 Japan 0.619
15 S. Korea  0.563 Belgium 0.595 Austria 0.599 Austria 0.615
16 Sweden 0.561 Denmark 0.591 Spain 0.589 Belgium 0.602
17 N. Zealand 0.550 Austria 0.583 Portugal 0.583 Spain 0.589
18 France 0.546 Spain 0.582 Belgium 0.582 Portugal 0.583
19 Portugal 0.543 S. Korea  0.546 S. Korea  0.558 France 0.554
20 Spain 0.541 France 0.544 France 0.552 Greece 0.541
21 Italy 0.502 Greece 0.535 Greece 0.551 S. Korea 0.539
22 Mexico 0.499 Turkey 0.516 Italy 0.514 Italy 0.502
23 Greece 0.491 Italy 0.501 Mexico 0.510 Mexico 0.477
24 Turkey 0.448 Mexico 0.499 Turkey 0.447 Turkey 0.437
    Source: Institutions Climate Index for OECD Countries.
1 The total number of components is 25. However, the sub-index
Optimal Taxation, consisting of three components, is treated here
as one component.See the methodological explanations in the arti-
cle of Eicher and Röhn in this issue.
2 Note that the index values of, e.g., 1994 correspond to institutions
averaged over 1988 to 1992 (see Eicher and Röhn in this issue).information as to which institutional areas a country
is behind in relative to the best practice country.We
analyse these questions by means of radar diagrams
(see Figures below). Each vector in the radar dia-
gram shows one dimension of institutional quality.
When the endpoints of each vector are linked, a
polygon is created that maps the numeric compo-
nents of each institution into one visual composite
profile for the Index. The visual representation is
important since any given overall index level can be
achieved with very different combinations of institu-
tional quality.In our radar diagrams,each vector rep-
resents the quality of one institutional dimension
expressed as a percentage of the best practice coun-
try in the year under consideration. For example, a
score of 80 percent for the Basic Institutional
Quality sub-index in 2000 for a given country implies
that the country’s score for this variable lags 20 per-
cent behind the score achieved by the country that
had the best existing Basic Institutional Quality in
2000. Finally the change in the shape of the polygon
can be examined to highlight the way in which
changes in the institutional makeup of the country
(and hence the value of the index) have come about.
High-ranking countries share some common institu-
tional characteristics. They have a favourable Basic
Institutional Quality. Governments protect property
rights,enforce law and order and prevent corruption.
Human capital is used efficiently. Tertiary and sec-
ondary enrolment rates are high. A considerable
portion of GDP is spent on public education. The
economy is open to international competition. The
labour markets are flexible. The Structure of
Government Expenditure is characterised by low
consumption.On the other hand,high-ranking coun-
tries also show some less favourable institutional
characteristics which,however,differ from one coun-
try to the other.Taxation is not always optimal.The
top marginal tax rate is – under the assumption that
taxes have a nonlinear effect on growth – either too
low or too high.The same is true for the tax wedge.
Divergence from Optimal Taxation is greatest in the
United States.The Fiscal Burden, that is to say total
tax revenue as a percentage of a country’s GDP, is
relatively high in the four advancer countries and
financial intermediation (Capital Markets) is (with
the exception the United States) rather low
(Table 2).
When we compare the institutional quality of high-
ranking countries we become aware that the institu-
tional setting is not uniform.Figure 1 (left part) com-
pares the United States and  Australia in 2006.
Whereas the tax system is much more favourable in
Australia than in the United States with respect to
economic growth, the United States has advantages
in other fields. Fiscal Burden is lower, government
spends, in relative terms, less on consumption, and
Labour Markets as well as Capital Markets are more
flexible.The differences in the quality of institutions
let us suppose that there is not only one “road” to
higher quality institutional performance.
Between high-ranking and low-ranking OECD
countries the institutional differences are of course
far larger. The latter have a relatively poor Basic
Institutional Quality, which is a fundamental imped-
iment to economic growth in these countries because
individuals are not sufficiently protected from the
government’s attempt to divert resources into
unproductive uses. A second impediment is the low
Human Capital Efficiency. Education is relatively
neglected in these countries. And finally, Labour
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Table 2 




















(21.1%) (21.0%) (16.7%) (14.9 %) (8.2%) (8.1%) (6.6%) (3.3%)
U S A 4 4 8 77 48 77 5 9 4 9 3 1 0 0
A u s t r a l i a 8 2 9 36 49 08 0 7 4 7 7 5 0
Canada 75 91 53 78 83 81 73 60
Ireland 64 86 67 63 100 72 80 72
Greece 80 55 47 61 75 44 77 54
I t a l y 9 7 4 43 15 48 5 2 9 6 3 5 8
Mexico 21 30 100 34 82 78 100 25
Turkey 81 23 59 24 77 35 76 25
Note: The percentages in brackets show the contribution of the sub-indices to the overall Institutions Climate Index.
  Source: Institutions Climate Index for OECD Countries.CESifo DICE Report 1/2007 53
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Markets (with the exception of Mexico) and Capital
Markets are too rigid. On the other hand, the insti-
tutional quality is quite close to international stan-
dards in the fields of taxation (with the exception of
Mexico), Fiscal Burden, Structure of Government
Expenditure and Trade Openness (Table 2).
The institutional structures of the four low-ranking
countries are also quite different. Figure 1 (right
part) compares the structures of Italy and Mexico in
2006.The great advantage of Italy is its tax system,
a system that seems to be much more favourable
than the Mexican one. In addition Italy dedicates
more resources to the educational sector and has
liberalised its Capital Markets to a larger extent.
On the other hand Italy is gravely lacking in other
policy and institutional dimen-
sions.The Fiscal Burden is much
higher than in Mexico, the
Structure of Government Ex-
penditure is less favourable and
the Labour Markets are more
rigid.
Why did the advancers gain
ground?
The strongest improvement in
terms of institutional climate
(Table 1) occurred in New Zea-
land. Ranked 17 in 1994, the
country climbed up the growth-
conducive climate ladder steadi-
ly during the following years and
reached rank 7 in 2006. Aus-
tralia, improving by 8 ranks over
the period considered, even out-
performed New Zealand insofar
as Australia’s advance took
place very quickly and led the
country to the first rank already
in 2002, where it has remained
until today. A considerable and
likewise steady institutional im-
provement can also be seen in
Finland.The country was ranked
14 in 1994 and reached place 8 in
2006.The route Denmark took is
somewhat different, because, in
the beginning of our period, the
country lost 3 ranks, moving
down from rank 13 (1994) to
rank 16 (1998). But in the following years the coun-
try was able to improve its institutional ranking con-
siderably,moving up to rank 14 (2002) and finally to
rank 9.
Figure 2 consists of four parts and shows the institu-
tional characteristics (8 sub-indices) of the four
“advancer” countries for 1994 and 2006. A higher
ranking over time means that the country concerned
has improved its institutional climate in relation to
other countries. This is reflected in Figure 2 in that
the lines for 2006 lie, in general, outside the lines for
1994. A 100 percent level for a certain institutional
sub-index is reached when a country is the top per-
former with respect to that characteristic during the
time under consideration.
INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE BEST PRACTICE 
COUNTRY,  2006
 (8 sub-indices)
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INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY IN FOUR "ADVANCER" COUNTRIES, 1994 AND 2006
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Figure 2Although the lines for 2006 are generally outside the
lines for 1994, the “radar” patterns and the changes
of the patterns are quite different. New Zealand has
improved most in terms of Labour Markets,Optimal
Taxation, Human Capital Efficiency and Trade
Openness, while in Capital Markets and Basic
Institutional Quality there was practically no change.
A medium improvement was attained in Structure of
Government Expenditures and Fiscal Burden.
Australia’s largest improvement was in Human
Capital Efficiency, followed by Structure of
Government Expenditures, Trade Openness and
Basic Institutional Quality. With respect to Capital
Markets, however, there was a decline.
Finland presents a somewhat skewed picture,mainly
due to weak performance in the variables Fiscal
Burden, Labour Markets, Capital Markets and
Structure of Government Expenditures in 1994. But
there have also been improvements in nearly every
institutional field. While Capital Markets being still
at a low level compared to the best performing coun-
try, Human Capital Efficiency, Trade Openness and
Labour Markets showed a significant gain. Even
Basic Institutional Quality – already at a high level
in 1994 – continued to improve and has now reached
the top performing level, as is the case for Optimal
Taxation.
The results of Denmark,another Nordic country,are
similar to that of Finland and similarly somewhat
skewed. Fiscal Burden had low scores in both coun-
tries, while the scores for Optimal Taxation and for
Basic Institutional Quality were similarly excellent.
In both countries, Capital Mar-
kets and Human Capital Ef-
ficiency have improved consid-
erably. Labour Markets received
much better ratings in Denmark
than in Finland but has im-
proved less.
Australia and New Zealand,
being the best performing coun-
tries of our four “advancers”,
have more or less “roundabout”
radar lines which, moreover, are
relatively close to the outer
100 percent circle. Both coun-
tries have improved some – but
not all – institutional characteris-
tics. The, albeit skewed, pictures
for Finland and Denmark show
that both countries are top performers in several
respects, but weaker performers with respect to
Fiscal Burden and Structure of Government
Expenditure. Both countries were not really able to
improve the situation in these two fields.If they had,
both countries would have achieved even better
scores.
Economic policy and reforms in two advancer
countries
New Zealand and Finland belong to the group of
countries that were able to improve considerably
their respective ranking in our index between 1994
and 2006.In the following we investigate the possible
underlying causes and consider the more detailed
version of institutional variables, where the 8 sub-
indices of Figure 2 are broken down into 23 compo-
nents (Figures 3 and 4, respectively).
New Zealand
During the 1980s New Zealand had already imple-
mented a series of important economic reforms, for
example, by liberalising foreign trade, opening the
financial sector and privatising state-owned enter-
prises (OECD 1999a). Its continuously improved
ranking in terms of institutional climate after that
first reform period (1994: rank 17; 1998: 14; 2002: 9;
2006:7) suggests that institutional and economic pol-
icy reforms not only have been continued but more
so than in other countries. Due to the delayed effect
of institutions on growth (and by applying moving
averages in the calculation), reforms from 1992
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Source: Institutions Climate Index.
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onwards were able to improve the index score and,
thus, the ranking.
The main reforms of the 1990s and early 2000s
focused primarily on labour market reforms, which
have been especially “radical” (OECD 1999). Wage
bargaining procedures were deregulated, unionism
was put on a voluntary and contestable basis.
Moreover, important reforms were implemented in
various sectors like energy,coastal shipping,railways
and taxi transport by introducing deregulation mea-
sures (not included in our index). Beside these
reforms, there were important reform steps in the
field of public finance by cutting tax rates and reduc-
ing expenditures,the latter mainly for social services.
These reforms succeeded in improving the institution-
al quality in New Zealand with respect to the sub-
index Labour Market and the sub-indices related to
public finance.But other sub-indices improved as well.
Figure 3 goes into more detail and characterises New
Zealand’s institutional climate on the basis of 23 com-
ponents between 1994 and 2006. At first glance, the
blue lines for 2006 are mostly, but not always outside
of (i.e., better than) the red lines for 1994.
We will now consider each sub-index and its compo-
nents in turn and start with the sub-index Basic
Institutional Quality. This sub-index is at a high and
nearly unchanged level and comprises seven compo-
nents:political stability,bureaucratic quality,rule of law
and order,respect for property rights,corruption,confi-
dence of the population in the economic policy of the
government and legal and administrative restrictions
against foreign investments (i.e., climate for foreign
investors). With respect to bureaucratic quality and
rule of law and order, New Zealand is still a top per-
former. In terms of property rights it was a top per-
former, but has now slightly declined. The relative
increase in the level of corruption is even higher.
Confidence of the population in the economic policy of
the government has improved considerably.This index
is based on a regular world-wide survey that has been
conducted by the Ifo Institute since 1991. The same
regular survey has also been used for the component
climate for foreign investors.This variable deteriorated
about 20 percentage points relative to other countries.
However, this tendency only partly coincides with the
result of an analysis of the OECD (2005, 59), namely
only for (the least restrictive) screening requirements
foreign investors have to fulfil. Apart from these
screening requirements the overall restrictions against
foreign investments were reduced in New Zealand
dramatically between 1980 and 1998 and are now
amongst the lowest in the world.
The sub-index Labour Markets consists of the com-
ponents labour market regulations, early retirement
and female labour force participation. Taken togeth-
er, the sub-index improved considerably (Figure 2),
but the components show different developments.
The largest relative improvement occurred in early
retirement. The underlying absolute change was a
reduction in the early retirement rate from 37 to
22 percent. Female labour force participation
increased (i.e., improved) relative to other countries
by 13 percentage points, while the participation rate
in absolute terms changed from 43 to 46 percent.The
central variable,labour market regulation,has deteri-
orated by 10 percentage points relative to other
countries. However, the underlying index measuring
labour market regulation (Fraser Institute) did not
show a remarkable change.The OECD (2005c, 96ff)
has expressed concerns that New Zealand, after
increasing the flexibility of labour markets during
the first and second reform wave, reversed this
course by having increased employment protection
since the late 1990s (OECD 2004, 117) and reducing
the degree of flexibility in that important market.
The variable Human Capital Efficiency with its four
components – public educational expenditure, aver-
age years of schooling of adults,secondary enrolment
and tertiary enrolment – also improved markedly.
The largest improvement occurred in tertiary educa-
tion. Relative to other countries New Zealand expe-
rienced a jump, improving this variable by 42 per-
centage points. The change itself is much smaller,
although still considerable. According to World
Bank data, tertiary enrolment increased from 61 to
85 percent. In public educational expenditure New
Zealand fell by 14 percentage points. However, the
change itself was positive, because the government,
indeed, increased total educational spending. This
again means that other countries did more.
Institutions of foreign trade (sub-index Trade Open-
ness), including the components tariff and non-tariff
barriers to trade (tariffs), the black market premium
for foreign currencies and the size of the trade sector
itself,also improved.The black market premium is of
course zero in New Zealand, resulting in a 100 per-
cent performance in this respect. A considerable
improvement relative to other countries can be seen
in the variable for trade barriers. Indeed, tariff rates
are below the OECD average (OECD 2005a, 77), aresult of earlier reduction rounds for tariff and
(mainly) non-tariff barriers.
The sub-index Structure of Government Expen-
diture, subdivided into (1) government consumption
and (2) government enterprises and investment
improved slightly. Government consumption itself
was slightly reduced during the period observed.But
other countries did the same.Thus,there is practical-
ly no relative change. The component government
enterprises and investment improved considerably,
which made New Zealand a 100-percent performer.
Between 1985 and 1995, i.e. partly before our period
of consideration,New Zealand privatised the bulk of
its state-owned enterprises. But single privatisation
actions were also carried out at the end of the 1990s.
Government tax revenues,or Fiscal Burden (without
a further sub-variable), is about 36 percent of GDP,
a value which has not changed very much during the
period considered. However, there was a small rela-
tive improvement.This improvement was mainly due
to tax rate reductions made in the earlier and later
active reform phases.
The sub-index Capital Markets, consisting of two
components – restrictions to international credit
flows  (capital market controls) and the degree of
credit intermediation (private sector domestic credit)
– declined slightly. With respect to the former vari-
able, there are practically no restrictions, making
New Zealand a top performer. The degree of credit
intermediation improved slightly, but is still on a
rather low level in comparison with other countries.
The sub-index Optimal Taxation,
the computed combination of
two variables – top marginal tax
rates and total tax wedge –
improved relative to other coun-
tries,but is still far removed from
the best performing countries.In
fact New Zealand has a relative-
ly low top marginal income tax
rate and a very low tax wedge.
Finland 
The second advancer country we
have chosen to look at more
closely is Finland. It started at
rank 14 in 1994. At that time
the country was experiencing a
strong recession. A banking cri-
sis in the early 1990s and the collapse of trade with
the Soviet Union combined with a weakened world
economy were responsible for the recession.At that
time Finland’s institutions had not yet adapted to
the economic structures of a modern open economy,
although some institutional reforms had been
undertaken in the late 1980s (OECD 2003, 32).The
economic crisis of the early 1990s was the starting
point, however, for major institutional and policy
reforms. Finland succeeded in improving its institu-
tional quality and climbed the ranking ladder until it
reached position 8 in 2006 (Table 1).
The institutional and policy reforms undertaken
since the early 1990s aimed at three objectives
(OECD 2003):
– The transformation of Finland into a knowledge-
and innovation-based economy. In order to
achieve this, human capital efficiency was in-
creased.
– The transformation of a heavily regulated econo-
my based on the principle of economic national-
ism into one based on open markets with high
competition. In order to achieve this objective,
emphasis was placed on increased openness of the
economy – capital markets were liberalised and
the goods and services markets were deregulated.
– The transformation of Finland into a society
where fundamental public institutions are effec-
tive and confidence in economic policy is high.In
order to achieve this objective, the basic institu-
tions, reflected in our sub-index Basic Insti-
tutional Quality,were improved by reforming the
public sector.
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The increase of Human Capital Efficiency was
mainly achieved by a rise of tertiary enrolment.
Whereas in 1994 the enrolment rate in Finland was
49 percent of the enrolment rate of the best prac-
tice country, in 2002 and 2006 it reached 100 per-
cent (Figure 4).Thirty-eight percent of the popula-
tion of age group 25–34 attained tertiary education
in 2004 (OECD 2006a, 39). The promotion of ter-
tiary education was, however, just one part of the
transformation of Finland into a knowledge- and
innovation-based economy. Reforms in other
fields, not included in our index, took place.
Investment in research and development (R&D)
was supported with a focus on information and
communication technologies, knowledge-based
technology centres were created, and education
and innovation policy was coordinated by a nation-
al science and technology council (Schienstock
2004). Human Capital Efficiency was, however, not
increased in every field. Secondary enrolment and
public educational expenditure deteriorated com-
pared to other countries.
The transformation of Finland into an open and
competitive economy was encouraged by accession
to the European Union in 1995. The transforma-
tion was achieved by an increase in Trade
Openness. Tariffs were reduced. Simplified and
efficient customs procedures were promoted.With
respect to tariffs the relative position of Finland
rose from 73 percent (1994) to 100 percent (1998)
and afterwards decreased to 88 percent (2006). A
friendly climate for international trade and invest-
ment was created.The size of the trade sector com-
pared to the expected size (given the population,
geographic size and location of Finland) rose (in
relation to the best practice country) from 34 per-
cent (1994) to 53 percent (2006). In addition to
opening the country, the Capital Markets were lib-
eralised.The liberalisation process,which started at
the end of the 1980s, consisted of abolishing rent
controls, exchange rate controls over short term
capital movements, controls over borrowing from
abroad and the ban on ownership of shares by for-
eigners in Finnish investment trusts (OECD 2003,
36).The index for capital market control increased
from 20 percent in 1994 to 90 percent in 1998 and
86 percent in 2006 (Figure 4).
The fundamental public institutions of Finland
(Basic Institutional Quality) are among the best in
the world. Finland has always been characterised by
a high institutional strength and quality of bureau-
cracy, a high level of law and order, an effective pro-
tection of property rights and very low corruption.In
the early 1990s only some deficiencies were appar-
ent. Confidence of the population in economic policy
was relatively low. Legal and administrative restric-
tions against foreign investments and lacking political
stability had a negative influence on foreign in-
vestors. In order to ameliorate its Basic Institutional
Quality, Finland has since then carried out reforms
to modernise public administration. Government
services have been commercialised, part of state
enterprises have been privatised and regulatory gov-
ernance policy has been improved (OECD 2003,
35–37). Because of these reforms Finland succeed in
surpassing all OECD countries in all fields of Basic
Institutional Quality in 2006 (Figure 4).
Although Finland has improved its institutional
quality considerably and has remained on top in the
sub-index Optimal Taxation, it was not one of the
high-ranking countries in 2006. Government tax rev-
enues as a percentage of GDP, which shows to which
extent government diverts resources from private
use, remained relatively high over the entire period.
The same is true for public consumption. The sub-
index Labour Markets is not in the best shape either,
with the exception of female labour force participa-
tion. Early retirement improved by 16 percentage
points from the low level of 22 percent relative to the
best performing country in 1994.Labour market reg-
ulation did not improve.
Why did the decliners lose ground?
The strongest decliner in the country rankings was
Japan. It was ranked among the top five countries
until 2001. Since then Japan dropped 8 ranks down
to 13 in 2002, and with a rank of 14 did not recover
in 2006. Similar, though less dramatic, is
Switzerland, which was ranked fourth in 1994 and
has since then fallen to rank 11 in 2006. The main
drop occurred between 1994 and 1998. Another
decliner is Norway, with rank 6 in 1994 and rank 12
in 2006. The main drop in its ranking position
occurred between 1998 and 2002.The fourth major
decliner is South Korea, which held position 15 in
the beginning and position 21 at the end.The main
drop in the ranking position occurred between 1994
and 1998 (Table 1).
In none of the four countries was the decline in the
ranking position due to just one of the 8 sub-indices.The loss of institutional quality is the result of grow-
ing deficiencies in several fields. In Japan Optimal
Taxation and Basic Institutional Quality have become
less favourable compared with other countries. The
Optimal Taxation sub-index went down from 83 per-
cent in 1994 to 62 percent in 2006. Basic institutions
deteriorated considerably.Corruption has been grow-
ing rapidly.The confidence of foreign investors in the
political stability of the country decreased as well as
the confidence of the population in the quality of eco-
nomic policy. In addition to Optimal Taxation and
Basic Institutional Quality, the sub-index Capital
Markets developed unfavourably. The private sector
of the economy faced difficulties in obtaining credit.
The Japanese economy became less open (Figure 5).
In Switzerland only minor changes in the institutional
components took place. Basic Institutional Quality
deteriorated mainly because of growing corruption.
The Fiscal Burden increased and the availability of
credit for the private sector decreased.Improvements
in other fields such as Labour Markets were not able
to compensate for this downturn.
In Norway the decline of the Trade Openness of the
economy, the shrinking availability of credit for pri-
vate firms and less favourable taxation led to a
decrease of institutional quality, although Human
Capital Efficiency increased and Labour Markets
improved.
The decline in the institutional quality of South
Korea is clearly attributable to Optimal Taxation
becoming less favourable and a deterioration of the
Structure of Government Ex-
penditure. Optimal Taxation
went down from 60 percent in
1994 to 34 percent in 2006 and
the Fiscal Burden from 99 per-
cent in 1994 to 83 percent in
2006. Government Expenditure
experienced an increase in con-
sumption. On the other hand
Human Capital Efficiency and
Trade Openness increased. But
these improvements were not
able to prevent the overall insti-
tutional quality of the country
becoming less favourable com-
pared to best practice countries
(Figure 5).
Economic policy and reforms in two decliner
countries
Japan and Switzerland are among the countries that
were unable to hold their ranking of 1994, according
to our index.In the following,we consider some pos-
sible underlying causes.
Japan
In 1994, Japan ranked second to the US. Since then,
the country lost ground in terms of institutional
quality, relative to other countries, quite drastically.
In 2006,Japan was only at rank 14.What are the rea-
sons which led to such a development? 
It is a general observation that institutional reforms
are caused and driven by pressing economic prob-
lems a country is facing.At the same time,such prob-
lems may make it more difficult to really implement
necessary reforms. In Japan, problems that necessi-
tate and impede reforms arose massively with the
collapse of the “bubble” of stock and real estate
prices in the early 1990s.This event was followed by
three successive severe recessions and a prolonged
period of deflation.
Japan’s economic policy answer to these problems
was mainly of a macroeconomic nature: monetary
policy aimed at lowering deflationary tendencies and
fiscal policy aimed at stimulating demand.There was
a rise in government consumption while productivity
enhancing expenditures for education were neglect-
ed. Fiscal deficits led to a quickly rising level of pub-
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lic debt.The Optimal Taxation sub-index deteriorat-
ed. While at the beginning of the economic crisis
banks extended loans without proper risk assess-
ment later on bank credits were restrained. Our
component private sector domestic credit deteriorat-
ed. Moreover, there were measures to protect
domestic firms from foreign competition.Thus, trade
size, already at a low level in 1994, was further
reduced in comparison to other countries. Finally,
the economic crisis in Japan had an unfavourable
impact on what we call Basic Institutional Quality.
There was a sharp rise in corruption and confidence
in economic policy decreased.The example of Japan
shows that in an economic crisis growth-enhancing
institutional reforms are difficult to implement.
Figure 6 shows the development the 23 components
of institutional quality made from 1994 to 2006.
Relative to the respective best performing country,
Japan lost ground in a majority of institutional char-
acteristics, which we will consider below.
The sub-index Basic Institutional Quality has deterio-
rated significantly (Figure 5). Of its seven components
four have deteriorated strongly: political stability,
respect for property rights,corruption and confidence of
the population in the economic policy of the govern-
ment. The increase in corruption – again relative to
other countries – is especially striking. The very high
bureaucratic quality was maintained and administrative
restrictions against foreign investors have been lowered.
While the overall Labour Markets sub-index re-
mained in a top position (Figure 5), its components
developed quite differently.
Labour market regulation deteri-
orated relative to other coun-
tries. A relatively high degree of
employment protection – at least
for regular workers – is a reason
for concern for the OECD
(2005a). Female labour force par-
ticipation has improved a bit but
is still relatively low in Japan. On
the other hand, male labour par-
ticipation,specifically that of per-
sons between an age of 55 and
64,is one of the highest in OECD
countries.Thus,early retirement is
low compared to other countries.
This is due to the old-established
employment behaviour of Ja-
panese enterprises as well as to
policy reforms of the government, which started in
2001 aimed at gradually increasing the official retire-
ment age from 60 to 65.
The sub-index Human Capital Efficiency (Figure 5)
has improved slightly but is still mediocre relative to
other countries. Of its four components, two have
deteriorated (public educational expenditure and sec-
ondary enrolment), while  tertiary enrolment has
improved. However, there is at least another aspect
of Human Capital Efficiency where Japan has
achieved long-term improvement. Public expendi-
ture for R&D (not included in the Index) as a per-
centage of GDP has increased continuously and sig-
nificantly since the early 1980s – from an interna-
tionally low to an internationally leading level
(OECD 2005b, 126).
Trade Openness, the next sub-index to be consid-
ered (Figure 5), is at a medium level only and has
deteriorated slightly during the period considered.
The components of the sub-index (tariff and non-
tariff barriers to trade, the black market premium
for foreign currencies and the size of the trade
sector itself) are at a very low level, but their
change is low. Remarkable is the low rating for
trade size. Indeed, the foreign trade ratio is around
only 9 percent. Trade barriers have practically not
changed.
The sub-index Structure of Government Expen-
diture has drastically deteriorated (Figure 5).This is
mainly due to the development of the component
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Figure 6creased. While Japan was a world leader in public
investment in percent of GDP during the late 1990s,
the ratio went down in the early 2000s and is now at
the average OECD level (OECD 2005a, 92).
The sub-index Fiscal Burden (Figure 5) has im-
proved somewhat, i.e. has been reduced. This is due
to consecutive tax rate cuts in order to overcome the
deflationary phase.However,the long period of pub-
lic deficits and the resulting increase of public debt –
now one of the main economic policy problems in
Japan – has led the OECD (2005a,74) to the conclu-
sion that expenditure cuts and an increase of rev-
enues are necessary.
The sub-index Capital Markets has likewise declined
(Figure 5).This is mainly due to lower bank credit to
the private sector, which is, in turn, a result of the
continuous attempt, albeit in small steps, of the gov-
ernment and the central bank to reduce the share of
non-performing loans in the banking sector.
The sub-index Optimal Taxation – the computed
combination of top marginal tax rates and total tax
wedge – has likewise deteriorated, relative to other
countries. The need for a comprehensive reform of
the Japanese tax system has already been formulat-
ed in an OECD study of 2000. But reforms in this
respect are still necessary (OECD 2005, 98f.).
Switzerland
The second decliner country we have a closer look at
is Switzerland. It was initially ranked in fourth place
in 1994. Since then Switzerland
fell seven ranks down to rank 11
in 2006. The main drops oc-
curred between 1994 and 1998
and between 2002 and 2006.
Switzerland is well-known for its
open economy, a favourable reg-
ulation of factor markets and a
small government. It is a society
where fundamental public insti-
tutions are effective, and confi-
dence in economic policy is high.
These institutional advantages
were responsible for Switzerland
being ranked fourth in 1994.
Since that time a piecemeal ero-
sion of institutional advantages
has taken place.Whereas central
institutions did not change in Switzerland, their
quality improved in other countries.This was espe-
cially true in the EU member countries,which were
forced to open up product markets, to promote
competition and to streamline regulation. Switzer-
land’s failure to keep up with the worldwide pace of
liberalisation and to reform its institutions has
eroded its relative attractiveness as a business loca-
tion (Gagales 2002).
Apart from this general inability to keep up with the
pace of structural reforms in other countries, more
visible deteriorations have taken place in three
fields. Public finances were in good shape in
Switzerland until the early 1990s. Public authority
budgets, however, started to deteriorate rapidly
from then on due to a vigorous growth in public
(especially social) expenditure. The public deficit
began to rise, and taxes as well as social contribu-
tions increased (OECD 2006b, 36–38). The Optimal
Taxation sub-index decreased from 37 percent
(1994) to 34 percent (2006), while Fiscal Burden
increased relative to other countries, which is
equivalent to a reduction of the tax revenue indica-
tor from 74 percent (1994) to 67 percent (2006;
Figure 7).
The second field where deterioration has occurred
is that of fundamental public institutions (Basic
Institutional Quality, Figure 5). Switzerland has
always been characterised by a high political stabil-
ity and bureaucratic quality, a high level of rule of
law and order, an effective protection of property
rights and very low corruption. This situation has
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changed,however.Between 1994 and 2006 the cor-
ruption index decreased from 100 percent to
66 percent, the index for law and order from
100 percent to 84 percent and the protection of
property rights index from 100 percent to 90 per-
cent (Figure 7). Swiss organisations are concerned
about this development and intent on fighting it
(Economiesuisse 2005).
The Swiss movement down the ranking position can
be attributed, thirdly, to the relative decline of the
sub-index Capital Markets (Figure 5). Private sector
domestic credit decreased by 15 percentage points
and capital market controls by 5 percentage points
from 1994 to 2006 compared to the best practice
country (Figure 7).
Improvements in the field of labour market regula-
tions, the increase of female labour force participa-
tion and of tertiary enrolment of students and less
restrictions against foreign investments were not
able to compensate the above mentioned institution-
al deteriorations.
Summary
A new index, called Institutions Climate Index, mea-
sures the growth-conduciveness of institutions in
OECD countries. While Eicher and Röhn in this
issue of the DICE Report highlight the underlying
method of construction and measurement of the
index, this article analyses how the growth prospects
of OECD countries have developed between 1994
and 2006 according to the overall index, its 8 sub-
indices and 23 components. It relates the index and
its sub-indices to the institutional changes and eco-
nomic policy reforms that have taken place in the
individual OECD countries.
The index makes it possible to rank countries
according to their institutional growth climate. The
United States, Australia, Canada and Ireland are at
the top of the scale.Turkey,Mexico,Italy and Greece
are positioned at the bottom of the index for the
entire period, indicating persistent institutional defi-
ciencies in these countries.
Institutions in OECD countries, however, are not
characterised by path dependency and inflexibility.
Institutions can change and can be changed.This has
been demonstrated by New Zealand, Australia,
Finland and Denmark,countries that improved their
ranking. New Zealand liberalised foreign trade,
opened the financial sector and privatised state-
owned enterprise in the 1980s and continued its
reform process in the 1990s by deregulating the
labour market and enforcing budget discipline.
Finland opened up its economy and started a trans-
formation process into a knowledge and innovation-
based economy.
On the other hand there are countries that lag
behind in the reform process. Japan, Switzerland,
Norway and South Korea belong to this group. In
Japan there was not much room for growth-enhanc-
ing institutional reforms because of severe reces-
sions in the 1990s. Switzerland has failed to keep
pace with the liberalisation process and institution-
al reforms in other European countries. Fur-
thermore, public budgets, the Basic Institutional
Quality and institutions of Capital Markets have
deteriorated.
The Institutions Climate Index does not only classi-
fy countries, it can also be used by governments to
analyse their own economic policy. The economet-
ric approach undertaken by Eicher and Röhn has
identified the most important institutional determi-
nants of growth.Taking a closer look at institution-
al deficiencies of one’s own country makes it possi-
ble to identify the institutions and areas of eco-
nomic policy that have to be reformed. Of course,
this can only be the starting point for a more pro-
found analysis of the causes of these deficiencies.
When drawing conclusions for a reform agenda,the
policy reforms in advancer countries can show how
reforms should be designed.
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